

## Message Text

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PAGE 01 CONAKR 00522 01 OF 02 311639Z

ACTION AF-08

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SP-02 PER-01 SIG-01 A-01  
MMO-01 EB-08 SCA-01 IO-13 INR-07 PM-04 CU-02  
AGR-05 AID-05 CIAE-00 COM-02 DODE-00 FEAE-00  
NSC-05 TRSY-02 USIA-06 /090 W  
-----311740Z 099882 /41

R 311600Z MAR 77

FM AMEMBASSY CONAKRY

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2894

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 CONAKRY 0522

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PFOR GV

SUBJECT: PARM-ANNUAL POLICY AND RESOURCE ASSESSMENT - PART I

REF: (A) STATE 038356; CERP 0001

1. U.S. INTERESTS. STRATEGIC: REDUCE THE SOVIET UNION'S MILITARY POSITION IN GUINEA, IN PARTICULAR CURTAIL ATLANTIC RECONNAISSANCE DEPLOYMENTS. ECONOMIC: PROMOTE AND PROTECT U.S. INVESTMENT (NOW ABOUT \$165 MILLION; ASSURE CONTINUED U.S. ACCESS TO MINERALS. POLITICAL: MODERATE GUINEA'S RADICAL HOSTILITY TOWARD THE WEST AND ITS PRO-SOVIET ORIENTATION. HUMANITARIAN: ENCOURAGE ECONOMIC PROGRESS AND THE WELFARE OF THE GUINEAN PEOPLE.

2. OVERVIEW. FOR YEARS "PROGRESSIVE" GUINEA WAS SUI GENERIS IN AFRICA, NOT A FACTOR OF MUCH CONCERN. NOW COMPARABLE REGIMES COVER MUCH OF THE CONTINENT, CONCENTRATE THEIR RADICAL PRESSURES AND INCREASINGLY ABET SOVIET MILITARY INTERESTS, POSING KNOTTY POLICY QUESTIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES.

SOVIET INFLUENCE REMAINS DOMINANT IN GUINEA. THE USSR GUARDS THE SEKOU TOURE REGIME AND ENJOYS  
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PAGE 02 CONAKR 00522 01 OF 02 311639Z

MILITARY AIR AND NAVAL ACCESS. SOVIET TU-95 AIRCRAFT DEPLOY FROM CONAKRY FOR SYSTEMATIC RECONNAISSANCE OF THE U.S. ATLANTIC FLEET. TOURE'S OBSESSIVE SECURITY FEARS LIMIT HIS FREEDOM OF ACTION VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIETS, UPON WHOM HE DEPENDS FOR PROTECTION. YET ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET BLOC HAVE STAGNATED WHILE FRANCE, THE WORLD BANK, AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ARE INCREASINGLY

ACTIVE AID DONORS AND TRADE PARTNERS FOR GUINEA. THE FRG COULD ALSO BECOME A SIGNIFICANT PRESENCE AGAIN ONCE DEBT CLAIMS WERE SETTLED. THE GUINEAN GOVERNMENT IS ACTIVELY SEEKING MORE WESTERN JOINT VENTURE CAPITAL. ALREADY THE EXPANDING HARD-CURRENCY INCOME FROM CBG BAUXITE, WHICH WILL SOON EXCEED \$100 MILLION PER ANNUM, GIVES GUINEA WIDER ECONOMIC OPTIONS. CBG IS ESSENTIALLY AN AMERICAN AND CANADIAN INVESTMENT. THE MIFERGUI-NIMBA IRON-ORE PROJECT SHOULD BE GUINEA'S SECOND BIG MONEY-EARNER STARTING IN THE 1980S.

THE DICHOTOMY BETWEEN SEKOU TOURE'S RADICAL, SOVIET-SYMPATHIZING FOREIGN POLICY AND HIS GROWING RELIANCE UPON WESTERN CAPITAL IS STRIKING; IN EFFECT, THE WEST IS PRESENTLY FINANCING A REGIME IN TURN COMMITTED, AT LEAST RHETORICALLY, TO THE WEST'S OWN DEFEAT. GUINEA'S EXPANDING ECONOMIC TIES WITH THE WEST COULD GRADUALLY ERODE HER MILITANCE, ALTHOUGH SEKOU TOURE IS A PRISONER OF HIS OWN IDEOLOGICAL RECORD AND LITTLE CHANGE CAN BE EXPECTED AS LONG AS HE IS DICTATOR. FORTUNATELY, DESPITE HIS PERSONAL CHARISMA AND DESPITE THE GROWING NUMBER OF SIMILAR "PROGRESSIVE" AFRICAN REGIMES, HIS INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE IS LIMITED BY GUINEA'S ISOLATION AND POVERTY. THE COUNTRY'S RIGID IDEOLOGY AND ITS DYSFUNCTIONAL INTERNAL STRUCTURE HAVE NUMBED THE ECONOMY, DRIVING A QUARTER OF THE POPULATION INTO EXILE. PROGRESS IN MINERAL EXPORTS AND EARNINGS HAS HAD VIRTUALLY NO SPINOFF IN THE AGRICULTURAL ECONOMY. GUINEA WILL NOT BE ABLE TO ABSORB EFFECTIVELY THE INCREASING VOLUME OF WESTERN AND ARAB DEVELOPMENT AID IT IS SCHEDULED TO RECEIVE.

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PAGE 03 CONAKR 00522 01 OF 02 311639Z

### 3. OBJECTIVES, COURSES OF ACTION, ISSUES.

--SINCE MARCH, 1976, THE U.S. HAS PRESSED GUINEA TO CURTAIL SOVIET TU-95 SURVEILLANCE FLIGHTS FROM CONAKRY, AND HAS USED A REDUCTION IN PL-480 RICE DELIVERIES AS LEVERAGE. THIS EFFORT HAS NOT SUCCEEDED, ALTHOUGH PRESIDENT TOURE HAS BEEN SENSITIZED TO U.S. CONCERNS (AND WILL CERTAINLY BE IMPRESSED THAT PRESIDENT CARTER RAISED THE ISSUE WITH THE NEW GUINEAN AMBASSADOR ON MARCH 23). THE EMBASSY HAS RECOMMENDED IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF THE 10,000 TONS OF RICE ALREADY COMMITTED, SETTING THE SCENE FOR HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL "AIR-CLEARING" TALKS. DISCUSSION OF FURTHER PL-480 COMMITMENTS SHOULD AWAIT A MORE SATISFACTORY GUINEAN RESPONSE TO OUR SECURITY INTERESTS. SEKOU TOURE'S SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE USSR, REINFORCED BY HIS SECURITY PARANOIA, MAKES HIM RELUCTANT TO CURB SOVIET MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS. HOWEVER, CONTROLLED U.S. PRESSURE (INCLUDING PL-480) IS UNLIKELY TO POSE A DOWNSIDE RISK TO OTHER KEY U.S. INTERESTS (E.G.,

MINERAL TRADE, INVESTMENT) IN GUINEA. WE SHOULD  
CONTINUE TO QUESTION GUINEA'S NONALIGNMENT AND INDEPENDENCE  
IN VIEW OF RUSSIAN MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS, SINCE GUINEANS  
ARE VERY SENSITIVE ON THIS POINT.

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PAGE 01 CONAKR 00522 02 OF 02 311722Z  
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R 311600Z MAR 77  
FM AMEMBASSY CONAKRY  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2895

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 CONAKRY 0522

WHILE ANY "US SECURITY GUARANTY" TO THE UNATTRAC-  
TIVE SEKOU TOURE REGIME -- AS THE GOG EARLIER REQUESTED--  
SEEMS OUT OF THE QUESTION, SECURITY IS TOURE'S ABIDING  
OBSESSION. IT HAS NEVER BEEN CLEAR WHAT HE REALLY MEANT  
BY A "SECURITY GUARANTY", AND ONE SENIOR GUINEAN OFFICIAL  
HAS DEFINED IT IN INNOCUOUS TERMS AS LITTLE MORE THAN  
AN EXPRESSION OF AMERICAN RECOGNITION OF GUINEA'S TERRI-  
TORIAL INTEGRITY. THE U.S. HAS LITTLE TO LOSE AND  
POTENTIALLY MUCH TO GAIN IN SYMPATHETICALLY DISCUSSING  
TOURE'S SECURITY PREOCCUPATION WITH HIM, PARTICULARLY  
SINCE THIS LIES AT THE HEART OF SOVIET INFLUENCE OVER HIM.  
WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO DO SO AND TO RESTATE PUBLICLY,  
IN A CONTEXT WHICH APPLIED TO GUINEA, THAT THE UNITED  
STATES BELIEVES IN THE INTEGRITY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF ALL  
AFRICAN STATES, AND THAT THE UNITED STATES OPPOSES  
ARMED AGGRESSION AGAINST ANY AFRICAN STATE.

-- FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE THE U.S. SHOULD  
MAINTAIN ITS MODEST PRESENCE IN GUINEA, CONDUCT LIMITED  
AID PROJECTS AND A CULTURAL PROGRAM SO AS TO KEEP THE  
DIALOGUE OPEN AND TO EMPHASIZE THE ALTERNATIVES TO  
SOVIET DOMINATION. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE  
U.S. FIRMS (E.G., U.S. STEEL, DELMONTE) TO CONSIDER  
PARTICIPATION IN JOINT VENTURE INVESTMENTS. WE SHOULD  
SUPPORT U.S. EXPORTERS, SINCE GUINEA'S IMPROVED FOREIGN  
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PAGE 02 CONAKR 00522 02 OF 02 311722Z

EXCHANGE SITUATION PERMITS SUBSTANTIAL PURCHASES.

--OUR USAID AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING PROJECT, SLOW AND FRUSTRATING AS IT MAY BE, IS OF DIRECT, LONG-TERM BENEFIT TO HUNGRY AND NEEDY GUINEANS REGARDLESS OF THE NATURE OF THEIR REGIME. IT SHOULD BE CARRIED FORWARD AND FUNDED TO PERMIT REALIZATION OF THE ORIGINAL PROGRAM DESPITE SOME COST INCREASES.

-- GUINEA HAS A DEPLORABLE HUMAN-RIGHTS RECORD, LIKE MOST AFRICAN COUNTRIES, BUT WE CANNOT EXPECT U.S. PRESSURES TO HAVE ANY EFFECT ON TOURE. IN FACT, OPEN DECLARATIONS SEEN AS INTERFERENCE IN GUINEAN AFFAIRS COULD BRING RADICAL, EVEN VIOLENT REACTION. CURRENT AND CONTEMPLATED U.S. AID PROGRAMS ARE ALL FOCUSED UPON THE RELIEF OF HUNGER AND POVERTY. MORE PUBLICITY ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS FROM MULTILATERAL OR NON-GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS AND IN WORLD MEDIA MIGHT HAVE SOME IMPACT -- PARTICULARLY SHOULD GUINEA SEE THIS AS AFFECTING HER STANDING WITH INTERNATIONAL (CAPITALIST) CREDITORS. THE U.S. SHOULD DISCREETLY ENCOURAGE SUCH PUBLIC ATTENTION.

--A KEY ISSUE IS WHETHER EXPANDED WESTERN AID AND OTHER ECONOMIC TIES WILL MODERATE GUINEA'S MARKED PRO-SOVIET ORIENTATION. THE FRENCH ARE OPTIMISTIC ON THIS SCORE, ALTHOUGH TO DATE SEKOU TOURE HAS BEEN ABLE TO COMBINE AN ECONOMIC (AND TO SOME EXTENT, POLITICAL) OPENING TO THE WEST WITH FULL MAINTENANCE OF HIS CLOSE IDEOLOGICAL AND MILITARY BONDS WITH THE SOVIET BLOC. IF THIS TREND CONTINUES, HARD QUESTIONS SHOULD BE RAISED ABOUT THE ADVISABILITY OF CONTINUING A HIGH VOLUME OF EC AND IBRD AID, WESTERN CREDITS AND INVESTMENT TO A COUNTRY UNDER STRONG SOVIET INFLUENCE AND IN AN AWKWARD STRATEGIC LOCATION.

--IT CURRENTLY APPEARS POSSIBLE TO CONDUCT A WORTHWHILE IF MODEST CULTURAL-INFORMATION PROGRAM IN GUINEA. WE HAVE RECENTLY ACHIEVED OR WILL SOON HAVE, INTER ALIA, TWO 1977 IVP GRANTEES, TWO MAJOR EXHIBITS, A VISITING  
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PAGE 03 CONAKR 00522 02 OF 02 311722Z

AMERICAN LECTURER, A FILM NIGHT, NINE AID SCHOLARSHIPS, SEVERAL SPORTS VISITS AND A PERFORMING JAZZ GROUP. THESE PROGRAMS AT THE MOMENT (MARCH 1977) ARE RECEIVING EXCELLENT PUBLICITY IN THE OFFICIAL MEDIA, ALTHOUGH THIS IS OF COURSE A POLITICAL DECISION WHICH THE GOG CAN TURN ON AND (MORE TYPICALLY) OFF. CONTINUED USIA/CU EFFORTS PROVIDE SOME COUNTERWEIGHT TO THE SOVIETS' NEAR MONOPOLY

OF INFORMATION AND EDUCATION IN GUINEA. THE EMBASSY RECOMMENDS CONTINUATION OF ONE USIS OFFICER POSITION AND A SLIGHT INCREASE IN OUR MODEST USIS AND CU BUDGETS.

--THE EMBASSY HAS OBTAINED A VERY POSITIVE REACTION FROM GOG LEADERS, PARTICULARLY THOSE ALREADY WELL DISPOSED TOWARD US, BY A FEW CAREFULLY SELECTED AND EXECUTED SELF-HELP PROJECTS. THE EMBASSY RECOMMENDS A DOUBLING OF THE SELF-HELP BUDGET IN THE NEXT FISCAL YEAR ON THE STRENGTH OF IDEAS NOW IN THE PIPELINE.

-THE EMBASSY SEES U.S. INTEREST SERVED BY SUPPORTING THE PRESENCE AND PROGRAMS OF WESTERN ALLIES IN GUINEA, PARTICULARLY THE FRENCH WHOSE POSITION IS IMPROVING DRAMATICALLY. AT THE SAME TIME, WE SHOULD WORK DISCREETLY TO SENSITIZE FRENCH REPRESENTATIVES TO STRATEGIC CONCERNS (E.G., SOVIET TU-95S) AND ENLIST THEIR MORE ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT. IT IS ALSO IN THE U.S. INTEREST TO SUPPORT THE PRESENCE OF THE MORE MODERATE AND CONSERVATIVE ARAB GOVERNMENTS, WHO ARE BECOMING ACTIVE IN GUINEA AND ARE HOSTILE INDEED TO "SCIENTIFIC SOCIALISM" AND TO SOVIET INFLUENCE.

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## Message Attributes

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